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By late May 1864, 
tlie Army of the 
Potomac resembled 
a wagon with the 
whe81s coming oft. 
Since May 4, when the army had crossed the Rapidan River and 
begun what would become known as the Overland Campaign, it 
had faced an incessant strain of day-after-day combat-in the Wil-
derness, at Spotsylvania Court House, at the North Anna River, and 
in a dozen smaller brushfires in between. The relentless pace had 
brought the Army of the Potomac to what its commanding general, 
Major General George Gordon Meade, believed was the end of its 
tether. "I don't believe the military history of the world can offer 
a parallel to the protracted and severe fighting which this army 
has sustained for the last thirty days," Meade complained, and he 
feared that "with all this severe fighting .. . the physical powers of 
the men would be exhausted." But Meade had little choice but to 
slog onward. Although he was still, by title, in charge of the army, 
he was taking direction from Lieutenant General Ulysses Simpson 
Grant, the overall general of all Union armies, and Grant was deter-
mined "to fight it out on this line," from the Rapidan to the Confed-
erate capital of Richmond, "if it takes all summer."! 
So far, it looked like it would take far beyond summer. Over the 
course of May's campaigning, the Army of the Potomac had lost a 
stomach-sinking total of 40,000 men out of action. And it would 
soon lose more without firing a shot, as 34 of the army's three-year 
regiments were due to see their enlistments expire in June. Histo-
rian John Cadman Ropes estimated that "exclusive of worthless 
bounty-jumpers and such trash," Grant had "only about 65,000 vet-
eran infantry in the three corps," an advantage of less than 10,000 
over his Confederate foe Robert E. Lee and the Army of North-
ern Virginia.2 To make up the shortfall, Grant raided the District 
of Columbia's garrison for another 33,000 men- although half of 
them were in huge heavy-artillery regiments and had never done 
anything more in the way of war than guard the intricate string of 
Washington's fortifications and pose heroically for photographers. 
On the other hand, the Army of Northern Virginia had also 
been severely ground down. James Longstreet, commander of 
the First Corps of the Army of Northern Virginia and Lee's "old 
war-horse," had been wounded by mistaken Confederate bullets 
in the Wilderness; Richard Ewell, another corps commander, had 
suffered a near-complete breakdown at Spotsylvania.3 Lee found 
replacements-Richard Heron Anderson for Longstreet and Jubal 
Early for Ewell-but neither Anderson nor Early would ever shine 
as great subordinates. And, like Grant, Lee would fill the gaps in 
the ranks only by stripping elsewhere, including the Richmond 
defenses of Robert F. Hoke's division and the Shenandoah Valley 
of John C. Breckinridge's division, and recalling the division com-
manded by the unreliable George Pickett from semi-exile in North 
Carolina. Above all, Lee could not repair the damage a month's 
savage fighting had done to the northern Virginia countryside, 
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Union s oldiers forage through a p otato field along the 
banks of the Pamunkey as elements of the VI Corps 
cross the river on a pontoon bridge during the Army of 
the Potomac's southward m ove in late May 1864. 
which he would need to feed his army. "There are no crops worth 
speaking of," reported one Yankee colonel. "The country is one vast 
graveyard-graves everywhere, marking the track of the army on 
the march and in battles."4 
D From a strir.t military point of view, Grant's great-est frustration on this campaign had been geogra-phy. The rivers of northern Virginia-the Rapidan, North Anna, and Pamunkey-ran west-east, and Lee 
attempted to make the most of their obstacles. Bitter fighting had 
taken place along all these rivers in May, and even if Grant could 
get across the Pamunkey without another costly fight, he would 
face Totopotomy Creek and then the Chickahominy River. 
But surprisingly, the movements across the Pamunkey and 
the Totopotomy proved the easiest of the entire campaign. On May 
27, the Army of the Potomac crossed the Pamunkey with two divi-
sions of Phil Sheridan's cavalry and the VI Corps (under Horatio 
Wright) at Dabney's Ferry.s Winfield Hancock's II Corps followed 
the VI, while the army's remaining two infantry corps, Gouverneur 
K. Warren's V Corps and Ambrose Burnside's IX Corps, crossed 
farther downstream at Newcastle Ferry. Grant also detached the 
XVIII Corps under William Farrar "Baldy" Smith from the stalled 
Union expedition on Bermuda Hundred, and brought them up to 
the York River, where they could disembark and extend the Union 
reach still farther, to the Totopotomy. 
Lee's response to this threat was curiously sluggish, and Grant 
took this as a sign that the long month of campaigning was finally 
wearing down the Army of Virginia. Despite the horrendous Union 
casualties, Grant convinced himself that "Lee's army is really 
whipped .... I may be mistaken, but I feel that our success over Lee's 
army is already assured."G On May 30, Grant extended the first ele-
ments of the Army of the Potomac over the Totopotomy, beginning 
with Warren's V Corps and a division of Sheridan's cavalry, pushing all 
the way down to the crossroads of Old Cold Harbor, only a mile and a 
half above the Chickahominy and less than 10 miles from Richmond. 
THE ETYMOLOGY OF THE odd name Cold Harbor has long been 
a puzzlement, since the village was neither a harbor nor, in the 
chalky-dry summer of 1864, anything like cold. But the name's 
genealogy stretches back to Roman Britain, where a col herbergh 
was an unfortified guard post along the Roman-built roads. John 
Stow's celebrated survey of the cities of London and Westminster 
names the Lord Mayor's mansion as "Cold Harbour," and it was not 
difficult for Shropshire antiquarian Charles Henry Hartshorne to 
find over 70 Cold Harbors in northern England alone in 1841.7 
Whatever the romantic origins of its name, the Cold Harbor 
in the Army of the Potomac's path consisted of little more than 
a tavern, a collection of buildings, and a crossroads. Seizing and 
holding the area would force Lee and the Army of Northern Vir-
ginia into a fast shuffle, giving Grant the opportunity to knock the 
Confederates apart with an attack. Grant could, in that case, "crush 
Lee's army on the north side of the James, with the prospect in case 
of success of driving him into Richmond, capturing the city per-
haps without a siege, and putting the Confederate government to 
flight." Politics contributed another behind-the-scenes motive. The 
Republican National Convention was due to assemble in Baltimore 
on June 7 to renominate Abraham Lincoln for the presidency. If 
Grant could deliver a significant victory on the eve of the conven-
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tion, it would enhance Lincoln's nomination and silence Radical 
Republican dissidents, who were already assembling their own 
rival convention in Cleveland to nominate John C. Fremont.s 
At first, this was exactly how the scene promised to play. Two 
Union cavalry divisions arrived at the Cold Harbor crossroads 
on May 31, clearing out a "slight force of [Confederate] cavalry." 
Alarmed, Lee at once tried to recover the crossroads by dispatching 
an entire division of Confederate cavalry under Fitzhugh Lee and 
diverting Robert Hoke's newly arrived infantry division; Richard 
Heron Anderson's corps would follow as fast as they could march. 
But neither Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry nor the first infantry brigades 
to get on the ground-Lawrence Keitt's South Carolina brigade and 
Thomas Lanier Clingman's North Carolinians-were able to dis-
lodge Federal troopers armed with repeating carbines.9 
Now began a race to get infantry to Cold Harbor, and Grant 
looked to be in the lead. Horatio Wright's VI Corps was already in 
motion after midnight on May 31, and William F. Smith's XVIII 
Corps had just debarked from its transports and moved down to 
the Totopotomy, with orders from Grant to push on to Cold Harbor. 
Sliding down behind them, the II Corps and V Corps would link up 
with the VI Corps and XVIII Corps and form a protective, west-fac-
ing shield a half-mile west of the Cold Harbor crossroads. 
Wright and the advance guard of the VI Corps arrived at Cold 
Harbor on June 1 to the delirious cheers of the Yankee cavalry and a 
band "out on the skirmish line playing 'Hail Columbia."' The prob-
lem was that this arrival did not occur until 9 a.m. Charles Dana, 
the assistant secretary of war, was traveling with the army, and 
coldly noted Wright's lack of energy. "Instead of having his advance 
there at 9 a.m.," Dana tattled furiously to Secretary of War Edwin 
Stanton, "it was General Grant's and Meade's design that his whole 
corps should be on the ground at daylight, when a rapid attack in 
mass would certainly have routed the rebel forces." Worse still, it 
was not until noon that the bulk of the VI Corps was fully in place, 
"getting into line of battle and digging rifle pits all along the line" 
west of Cold Harbor. Baldy Smith and the XVIII Corps had been 
given wrong directions by a staff officer, and didn't appear until 
Delays in the attack of the Union VI and xvm Corps on June I allowed 
Confederate troops at Cold Harbor to erect hasty, but effective, breastworks. 
BELOW: XVIU Corps commander William F. Smith (seated) and his 
staff in June 1864. ABOVE: Part of the Rebel defenses at Cold Harbor. 
"about 3 p .m., after a march of more than twenty-
five miles."IO 
Nevertheless, Wright and Smith had pre-
emptory orders from Meade to move to the attack. 
"General Wright is ordered to attack as soon as his 
troops are up," Meade wrote to Smith at noon, "and 
I desire you should co-operate with him and join in 
the attack." Just by the numbers, Wright and Smith 
should have been more than sufficient for the task; 
together, they could mass six divisions-between 
25,000 and 30,000 men-and even though it took 
another three hours to get "into position a little to 
the west of the old tavern, at Cold Harbor Cross 
Roads," by 6 p.m., the two Federal corps "were 
formed in four lines of battle, by regiments," and 
ready to advance to the attack.ll 
But the delay gave the Confederates time 
to entrench, a recurring course of events on the 
campaign, and one that usually had fatal conse-
quences for Federal attackers. Hoke's division, 
with its four brigades, had been joined by Breck-
inridge, and then by Joseph B. Kershaw's division 
(from Anderson's corps) and Harry Heth's divi-
sion (from A.P. Hill's corps), and together they 
had dug themselves into defenses along a string 
of hills and ridges perpendicular to Cold Harbor 
Road, just west of the crossroads. The entrench-
ments were something less than a marvel of engi-
neering. The terrain was cut sharply by ravines, 
gullies, and streams, and Thomas Clingman 
(whose North Carolina brigade held the first sec-
tion of the line stretching northward from Cold 
Harbor Road) was bothered by a gap "of about 
seventy-five yards" made by a stream that ran 
between his left flank and the next Confederate 
brigade, William T. Wofford's, in Kershaw's divi-
sion. There was at least enough time to create 
an abatis of cut pine trees, "interlocking with 
each other and barring all farther advance." That 
would have to do.l2 
Sometime before 6 p.m., with "the sun ... less 
than an hour high," both Wright's and Smith's 
corps "almost simultaneously" advanced "to the 
To view this article's reference notes, turn 
to our Notes section on page 78. 
THE BATTLE OF COLD HARBOR I COLD HARBOR , VIRGINIA I 
Determined to defeat Robert E. Lee's Army of Northern Virginia and take Richmond, Ulysses S. Grant advanced the Army of 
the Potomac southward in May 1864, looking for a fight. After clashing with Lee in a series of bloody but indecisive battles, 
including at the Wilderness and Spotsylvania Court House, Grant launched another attack at Cold Harbor. a tiny crossroads 
town less than 10 miles from the Confederate capital. On June 1, Union forces repeatedly assaulted Lee's outnumbered but well-
entrenched Confederates. but to no avail. The same result awaited the Union troops who renewed the attack two days later. 
By the time Grant finally called a halt to the operations on June 3, over 13,000 of his men were dead, wounded, or missing. 
Grant would later admit he regretted the assault at Cold Harbor "more than any one I have ever ordered." 
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Men of Brigadier General Jan1es Ricketts' VI Corps division advance to assault an entrenched 
Confederate position during the fighting of June 1. The attack, which pierced the Rebel line, was 
one of the day's few successes for Union forces. 
charge, a dash by more than 25,000 men." Smith's XVIII Corps 
went into the attack "in battalions in column closed in mass," trying 
to spear their way through the Confederate defenses. A soldier in 
the 25th Massachusetts Infantry saw that "they had entered the 
opening of a valley shaped iike a horse-shoe, and that the land rose 
in front and on either flank, covered with wood and brush, so that" 
even in their hastily contrived "line of rifle-pits and a low breast-
work of logs and rails," the Confederate fire was too heavy to stand. 
Once they had overrun the outer skirmish line, the men of the 
XVIII Corps "were at the mercy of a concealed enemy," and began 
to fall back."I3 
In front of the VI Corps, the going was even tougher. One of 
David Russell's brigades, commanded by the newly promoted 
Emory Upton, had been reinforced by the 2nd Connecticut Heavy 
Artillery, one of the units Grant had fished from the Washington 
fortifications. The unbloodied "heavies" counted an unwieldy 1,800 
men in line (heavy artillery regiments had to maintain both an artil-
lery and an infantry component), and they were more than twice 
as big as the entire rest of Upton's brigade (the 5th Maine, 95th 
and 96th Pennsylvania, and Upton's own I 21st New York). In their 
unfaded uniforms, brass shoulder scales, and red-pipedjackets, 
they endured endless jibes as "fresh duck" and "pets of the War 
Department." Cold Harbor offered them their first opportunity to 
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prove themselves.I4 
Emory Upton was only too happy to oblige. 
He formed up his brigade in four lines: three bat-
talions of the 2nd Connecticut (with four com-
panies in each battalion line) and the rest of the 
brigade in the fourth line. Their colonel, Elisha 
Kellogg, led from in front , wearing a straw hat 
and aiming directly at Thomas Clingman's North 
Carolina brigade, 400 yards away. They brushed 
through the outlying Confederate skirmish line, 
crossed an open field, then spilled down into a 
ravine and up the far side, where Clingman's 
main line was waiting for them. "A sheet of flame, 
sudden as lightning, red as blood, and so near it 
seemed to singe the men's faces, burst along the 
rebel breastworks," wrote the adjutant of the 2nd 
Connecticut, Thomas Vaill. "The air was filled 
with sulphurous smoke, and the shrieks and 
howls of almost two hundred and fifty mangled 
men, rose above the yells of the triumphant 
rebels." In the rear rank of the Union attack, a 
soldier in the 121st New York could see the Con-
necticut "heavies" collapse "in all shapes. Some 
DRAWING BY EDWIN FORBES 
would fall forward as if they had caught their feet 
and tripped and fell. Others would throw up their 
arms and fall backward. Others would stagger 
about a few paces before they dropped."I5 
Kellogg was still on his feet, and close enough 
that Clingman noticed him and locked eyes for a 
moment even as he gave the order to fire. Kellogg 
took off his hat to cheer his men on, but Cling-
man's fire "knocked down the front ranks of the 
column, while the oblique fire along the right and 
left cut down men rapidly all along the column 
towards the rear." Kellogg was shot in the arm, 
and struggled to give the order to about-face 
when he was hit in the head and fell dead "upon 
the interlocking pine boughs" of the abatis. The 
slaughter was so unnerving that Emory Upton, 
whose horse had been shot from under him, actu-
ally stopped the second battalion of the "heavies" 
from going in and ordered them to lie down, then 
recruited a squad of marksmen to join him in 
picking off Confederate heads above the breast-
works in order to dampen the Rebels' enthusiasm 
for more firing.IG 
Yet the June 1 attack was not entirely unsuccessful. Although 
Upton's brigade was stalled and pinned down, it did not retreat. 
Andjust as Thomas Clingman had feared, when James Ricketts' VI 
Corps division hit the gap between Clingman's line and Kershaw's 
division, one of Ricketts' brigades broke through, flinging William 
Wofford's Georgia brigade backward in panic. The brigade "car-
ried the works in its front and captured several hundred prisoners, 
who were taken to the rear," then "notwithstanding the difficul-
ties encountered in a dense thicket and swamp," they forced both 
Hoke's and Kershaw's divisions to abandon their entrenchments 
and pull back a quarter-mile to a new lineP 
THE COMING OF DARKNESS gave Lee space to move more of 
Anderson's and A.P. Hill's brigades down to the hastily redrawn 
Cold Harbor defenses. He could be grateful that on June 2, 
the weather, which had been sand-dry through May, suddenly 
clouded over and brought on a "deluge of rain." Meade and Grant 
had seen just enough success so far that (as they had done at 
Spotsylvania) they decided to try another attack, this time adding 
Warren's V Corps and Hancock's II Corps to make the blow at 
Cold Harbor an overwhelming one. Grant's intention, Horace 
Porter recalled, "was to attack early in the morning ... push it 
vigorously, and if necessary pile in troops at the successful point 
from wherever they can be taken." But getting Hancock's corps 
to Cold Harbor proved no easier than getting Wright and the VI 
Corps there the day before. Hancock denounced it as "the most 
severe march of the campaign, marching ten and one-half hours 
until June 2." The head of the old Irish Brigade only "reached Cold 
Harbor at 6.30 a.m.," and even then was "in such an exhausted 
condition that a little time was required to allow the men to collect 
and to cook their rations." Reluctantly, Grant delayed any fresh 
attack until 4 p.m. Then down came the "tempest of wind and 
rain." Hancock "was so earnest in opposition to" the idea of an 
assault "that Meade countermanded the order," and set the attack 
back to 4:30a.m. on June 3.1s 
As Hancock and Warren arrived, Grant positioned Hancock's 
corps on the left of the VI Corps, below Cold Harbor Road; Lee 
promptly matched that by bringing up the balance of A.P. Hill's 
corps, along with Breckinridge's division. He lined them up opposite 
Hancock and set them to digging. All the Rebels needed was time, 
and Hancock's tardiness and the afternoon downpour granted it. 
"Both sides anticipated battle on the 3rd," wrote Confederate artil-
leryman Robert Stiles. But since the Confederates intended to fight 
this battle on the defensive, they "set to work to rectify the lines 
about this point." One of Anderson's brigadiers, Evander Mcivor 
Law, actually "laid off the new line with his own hand and superin-
tended the construction of it during the night of the 2d."I9 
The rest of the Army of the Potomac knew how to read these 
signs. As Horace Porter wandered along the lines, observing the 
"preparations for the next morning's assault, I noticed that many 
of the soldiers had taken off their coats and seemed to be engaged 
in sewing up rents in them." At first, he thought this was a charm-
ing but puzzling effort to look one's best in a fight. "But upon closer 
examination it was found that the men were calmly writing their 
names and address on slips of paper, and pinning them on the 
backs of their coats, so that their dead bodies might be recognized 
upon the field, and their fate made known to their families at home. 
They were veterans who knew well from terrible experience the 
danger which awaited them .. .. " 20 
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While showing initial promise in places, the attack by the Army of the Potomac's II Corps on June 3 ended in 
disappointment. ABOVE: II Corps commander Winfield Scott Hancock (seated) is shown with his division commanders 
(from left to right): Francis Barlow, David Birney, and John Gibbon. OPPOSITE PAGE: Men of the 7th New York Heavy 
Artillery break through the Confederate lines on June 3 before being pushed back by a counterattack. 
D t g, a single signal shot was fired from the lOth Massachusetts battery. The first light was "cloudy and foggy," and the rain was "still pattering in fitful showers." In the "blinding mist," 
Union officers could barely discern on the south side of the road an 
"intrenched line of the enemy .. . on a low hill that was quite long, 
ending ... on the Chickahominy swamps, making it quite impossible 
to turn the position without crossing the river." Against this ground, 
Grant proposed to throw all three divisions of Hancock's II Corps, 
storming against the Confederate entrenchments south of Cold 
Harbor Road; north of it, Wright and Baldy Smith would renew 
the attacks the VI and XVIII Corps had made two days before. 
"The tactical movement was very simple," wrote Charles Porter 
of the 39th Massachusetts. "Each corps commander was to form 
his corps as he might determine, a grand rush was to be made, and 
great were the hopes that success would crown our arms."21 
Hancock formed his corps with the divisions of Francis Barlow 
and John Gibbon in front, and David Birney's division in reserve, 
ready to exploit any opening. Barlow, in turn, formed his four bri-
gades into two waves, and as the Federal artillery erupted with a 
barrage "heavy and incessant" enough to awaken Richmonders 
"from their slumbers," his two lead brigades sprang forward, 
headed for the trenches held by John Breckinridge's small division. 
Double-quicking, and "without firing a shot," Barlow's men over-
ran the Confederate picket line, crossed over a sunken road at the 
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base of the long hill occupied by the Rebels, "and 
swept into the enemy's lines, capturing prisoners 
and three pieces of artillery." There were no "arti-
ficial obstructions, such as abatis or 'slashings,' 
to detain an assaulting column," and the 7th New 
York Heavy Artillery, in John Brooke's brigade, 
snatched the regimental flag of Breckinridge's 
26th Virginia Battalion.22 
But the going was less easy farther north-
ward. In John Gibbon's division, the 155th New 
York made a rapid advance to "within So yards of 
the enemy's works." But the hill was steeper here, 
and the "sunken road" in the ravine deeper, and 
in the face of "the heavy fire from the enemy's 
breastworks, it was impossible for the regiment 
to gain the works." After 30 minutes of point-
less punishment, the New Yorkers began inch-
ing backward, until, "at about 150 yards from the 
enemy's line the regiment halted and established 
a new line .. . by using fence rails and throwing up 
earth with bayonets and tin cups." Soon enough, 
even Barlow's headlong attack lost its momen-
tum. The n6th Pennsylvania "succeeded in gain-
ing the main works of the enemy ... but they were 
soon forced out by the heavily reinforced Con-
federates." They "fell back ... about seventy-five 
yards from the enemy's line and quickly covered 
themselves with rifle pits or took advantage of 
such shelter as the broken ground afforded."23 
Eventually, Barlow's men, too, began to wilt 
under Confederate counterattacks, clambering 
out of "the captured works" and fleeing "wildly 
for the protection of ... the Union guns." In all, 
"twenty minutes had not passed since the infan-
try had sprung to their feet," and now the "dazed 
and utterly discouraged" survivors "drifted off 
... and found their regiments, but some of them 
drifted to the rear and to coffee pots."24 
Still, the failure of Hancock's attack was less 
dismal than the result that awaited Wright and 
Smith on the north side of Cold Harbor Road. 
"About sunrise here they came," wrote Wil-
liam McClendon of the 15th Alabama, "charging 
through the pine thicket, huzzaing as they came, 
expecting to run over and capture all that were in 
the breast-works." Smith's XVIII Corps jumped 
to their attack in close column, "ten lines deep, 
with arms at a trail," and so closely packed that 
"it was hardly possible for a ball to pass through 
without hitting some one .... I never in all the 
bloody conflicts that I have been in saw such 
destruction of human lives. They literally piled 
on top of one another, often the dead would hold 
down the wounded and vice versa." Griffin Sted-
man's brigade was stacked in column of regi-
ments, with the 12th New Hampshire first, then 
the nth Connecticut, 8th Maine, and 2nd New 
Hampshire. The 12th took the brunt of the fire, 
the men (according to Sergeant John L. Piper) 
bending over "as they pushed forward, as if 
trying .. . to breast a tempest, and the files of men 
went down like rows of blocks or bricks pushed 
over by striking against one another." Another 
sergeant, Jacob Tuttle, saw so many of his men 
drop to the ground at once that he thought he had 
missed an order to lie down. He was wrong. Most 
of his company had been killed outright, and he 
"dropped ... among the dead, and did not dis-
cover my mistake until my living comrades had 
advanced some distance beyond me."25 
The Confederates who opposed them could 
scarcely believe the easy targets the Yankee attackers offered. "The 
excitement ran so high ... that the surgeon of the regiment quit 
his litter corps and was in the line firing before I discovered him," 
marveled one Confederate, while "the officers, with hats in hands, 
went up and down the line, feeling so much elated that they would 
strike the men over the heads and faces and shout with all the joy 
ever expressed at a camp-meeting by a new convert." The Alabama 
brigadier, Mcivor Law, "found the men in fine spirits, laughing and 
talking as they fired .... I had seen nothing to exceed this. It was not 
war; it was murder." Or even worse, massacre. William Oates, com-
manding the 15th Alabama in Law's brigade, saw the 25th Massa-
chusetts barreling toward him "in a column by divisions, thus pre-
senting a front of two companies only." The Alabamians opened up 
"the most destructive fire I ever saw .... I could see the dust fog out 
of a man's clothing in two or three places at once where as many 
balls would strike him at the same moment. In two minutes not a 
man of them was standing. 26 
At some point, the havoc ceased to make sense even to the 
Confederates who were wreaking it. In front of Law's Alabama bri-
gade, a Union regiment had been "so roughly handled" that most 
of its survivors had fallen back without orders-except their color 
sergeant who, oblivious of his abandonment, "steadily advanced, 
solitary and alone, proudly bearing his flag." Not even Law's hard-
nosed veterans could stand shooting the man, and instead began 
waving their arms and yelling, "Go back! Go back! We'll kill you!" 
When his peril finally dawned on him, the Yankee sergeant stopped, 
lifted his flag from its socket, and looked anxiously and deliberately 
"first to the right rear, and then his left rear." Then "with the same 
moderation gathered in the flag, right-shoulder-shifted his charge, 
came to and about-faced as deliberately, and walked back amid the 
cheers of Law's men."27 
The mood was less generous among the battered survivors of 
the VI and XVIII Corps. Orders "to renew the attack without refer-
ence to the troops on the right or left" were issued, conveyed, and 
passed down "through the wonted channels; but no man stirred, 
and the immobile lines pronounced a verdict, silent yet emphatic, 
against further slaughter." In Stedman's brigade, one captain "stood 
up before his superiors in rank" and "declared with an oath that 
he would not take his regiment into another such charge, if Jesus 
Christ himself should order it." Baldy Smith was more succinct: 
"I received a verbal order from General Meade to make another 
assault, and that order I refused to obey."2S 
D The a n a mo o June 3lasted barely an hour. All operations had practically halted by 11 a.m., and at 12:30 p.m., Grant advised Meade that "The opinion of the corps commanders not being sanguine 
of success in case an assault is ordered, you may direct a suspen-
sion of farther advanced for the present." There was desultory 
fighting farther northward at Bethesda Church, and in the eve-
ning, A.P. Hill's Confederates attempted a short-lived counterattack 
below Cold Harbor Road to clear what small advances the Yankees 
had made there in the morning. But Federal artillery vengefully 
"opened with shell, case, and solid shot," leaving "the rebel line back 
broken and shattered" and "leaving their dead and part of their 
wounded on the field."29 
This was small consolation to Grant, who had hoped to deliver 
a fatal military blow to the Army of Northern Vir- ,... l CONT. ON P. 74 
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CONTINUED FROM P. 23 
the very nature of freedom was being 
questioned and the bonds ofrestricted 
servitude were being broken, and 
when the unfulfilled promise that "all 
men are created equal" was tenta-
tively held out to an expectant genera-
tion of American women who, almost 
20 years earlier at Seneca Falls, had 
CONTINUED FROM P. 27 
trophies of a very small victory culled 
from a much larger, bloodier defeat. 3 
Since the turn of the 20th century, 
multiple renditions ofthis story have 
been circulated, each with a varying 
explanation as to who exactly killed 
Skaggs and, perhaps more interest-
ingly, who began the process of mutila-
tion. Regardless of storyteller, though, 
one element remained constant: The 
tactics of terror so gleefully employed 
by Larkin Skaggs were turned on him 
wholesale. By the aftemoon of August 
21, 1863, the morning's most exultant 
hunter had become the hunted. The 
town's own carnival of the grotesque 
had become a macabre kind of therapy. 
And therein the cogs of irregular vio-
lence turned along the Missouri-Kan-
sas border. Death spawned grief; grief 
necessitated vengeance; and so, as 
Larkin Skaggs discovered too late, the 
cycle of violence kept rolling on. Cl 
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inscribed their gender onto Thomas 
Jefferson's ringing prose. 
It would be many years before 
their sisters-in-arms would reap the 
benefit of their fledgling feminist 
agitation-in a world where the word 
"feminist" did not even exist. Like 
many pioneers, they sowed the seeds 
that they would not live to see burst 
into flower. Q 
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Creek, and several other battles 
during the Civil War, proved is that 
when soldiers are more interested in 
the spoils of war than the fate of the 
enemy, good tactical judgment and 
discipline can easily disappear. Q 
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ginia. With the Republican convention 
so near at hand, he was unusually terse 
in the notification he sent to Wash-
ington before the end of the day on 
June 3. "We assaulted at 4.30 a.m. this 
moming, driving the enemy within his 
intrenchments at all points .... Our loss 
was not severe." Suspiciously, Grant 
refused to ask for the customary post-
battle truce to recover the wounded 
trapped between the armies. Tradition 
dictated that the loser ask for the truce, 
but Grant was unwilling to make such 
an admission until5:30 p.m. on June 7, 
by which time the Republican conven-
tion was already in full swing. 3D 
To his staff, however, Grant freely 
admitted that he had made a hideous 
mistake. "I regret this assault more 
than any one I have ever ordered ... 
as it has proved, no advantages have 
been gained sufficient to justify the 
heavy losses suffered." He would even-
tually have to report-as an aggregate 
of all the casualties from the cavalry 
fight at the crossroads, the infantry 
attacks on June 1 and 3, and the skir-
mishing that followed for the next 
week-a depressing total of 13,153 
killed, wounded, or missing from the 
Army of the Potomac. Only a third of 
these actually took place on the fatal 
morning of June 3. But eventually the 
futile assaults that morning came to 
stand for the cluster of battles around 
Cold Harbor, and the staggering total 
of over 13,000 fixed itself in the public 
mind for June 3 alone. 31 
Cold Harbor would cling to Grant 
like mud, sealing his image as an 
unfeeling butcher whose primary stra-
tegic metaphor was a meat grinder. 
For the Army of the Potomac, Cold 
Harbor would remain a monument 
to chances lost instead of seized. "It is 
very interesting to revisit the battle-
fields of the war, but I never heard any 
one who was engaged there express a 
wish to see Cold Harbor again," wrote 
a former VI Corps staffer after the war. 
"It remains in memory the Golgotha of 
American history."32 Q 
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